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Abstract
By enlarging the parameter space originally considered by Singh and Vives (1984) to allow
for a wider range of cost asymmetry, Zanchettin (2006) finds that the Singh and Vives result
that firms always make larger profits under quantity competition than under price
competition fails to hold. This paper shows that while profit ranking between price and
quantity competition can be (partially) reversed the celebrated result by Singh and Vives that
firms always choose a quantity contract in a two-stage game continues to hold in the enlarged
parameter space.
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1.  Introduction 
 
In their seminal paper on price and quantity competition in a differentiated duopoly, Singh 
and Vives (1984) present three important findings (stated here assuming that goods are 
substitutes): (i) both consumer surplus and total surplus are larger under price competition 
than under quantity competition; (ii) both firms’ profits are higher under quantity competition 
than under price competition; and (iii) both firms choosing the quantity contract is a dominant 
strategy equilibrium in the two-stage game in which firms choose between a price contract 
and a quantity contract in the first stage and then compete accordingly in the second stage. 
Recently, Zanchettin (2006) relaxes the parameter restriction imposed implicitly by Singh and 
Vives to allow for a wider range of cost asymmetry and finds that while conclusion (i) above 
continues to hold conclusion (ii) above does not hold in the larger parameter space. In 
particular, Zanchettin (2006) finds that, with high degrees of cost asymmetry and/or low 
degrees of product differentiation, both the efficient firm’s profits and total profits can be 
higher under price competition than under quantity competition.  
Since conclusion (iii) above is based on the ranking of firms’ profits under different 
modes of competition, the finding of Zanchettin (2006) of the possibility of partial reversal in 
profit rankings calls into question whether conclusion (iii) holds in the larger parameter space. 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the two-stage game originally studied by Singh and 
Vives by allowing for the larger parameter space considered by Zanchettin (2006). Our main 
conclusion is that, in the larger parameter space, both firms choosing the quantity contract is 
the only Nash equilibrium in the two-stage game; it is either a dominant strategy equilibrium 
or a weakly dominant strategy equilibrium. Hence the possibility of reversal in profit 
relationships will not alter the conclusion that in the two-stage game in which firms first 
commit between a price contract and a quantity contract and then compete accordingly they 
will always choose the quantity contract. 
 
2.  Model Setup 
 
Our model setup is the same as in Zanchettin (2006). Two goods, 1 and 2, are produced by 
firm 1 and firm 2, respectively. Firm i (i = 1,2) has a constant unit cost of production  i c . It is 
assumed that  12 cc ≤  so that firm 1 is at least as efficient as firm 2. The inverse demand 
functions for the two goods are given by: 
 
ii j pq q =α− −γ ,     i,j 1,2 = ; ij ≠ .     (1)
 
In (1), α represents consumers’ reservation price for either good and γ is the substitution 
parameter. As in Zanchettin (2006), we focus on the case of substituting goods (i.e., 01 < γ< ). 
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asymmetry between the two firms. The range of this parameter is (0,1) and it increases as the 
cost gap between the two firms decreases. As pointed out by Zanchettin, the monopoly 
outcome in which firm 1 becomes a monopoly under either price or quantity competition 
prevails if x/ 2 ≤γ . Zanchettin’s focus and also our focus is thus the space  r S  = {0 < γ < 1; 
/2 x 1 γ< ≤ }.
1 Compared to Singh and Vives (1984), the space  r S  allows for a larger range of 
cost asymmetries between the two firms. 
In the space Sr, both firms produce a positive output in the Cournot equilibrium. More 














(c ) ( 2 x )
4
⎡ ⎤ α− −γ














(c ) ( 2 x)
4
⎡ ⎤ α −− γ




Within the space Sr, both firms produce a positive output in the Bertrand equilibrium if  
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Within the space Sr, the limit-pricing equilibrium in which only firm 1 produces a positive 
output prevails if condition (4) is not satisfied and the Bertrand equilibrium values in this case 
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1 The space Sr includes as a subset the space considered by Singh and Vives which is {0 < γ < 1;  x1 γ <≤ }. 
Here, the space Sr is slightly different from that defined in Zanchettin (2006) in that the line in which γ = 1 is 






  To complete the two-stage game, we next provide equilibrium values for the cases in 
which firm 1 and firm 2 choose different contracts in the first stage of the game. Consider first 
the (Q, P) case in which firm 1 chooses the quantity contract while firm 2 chooses the price 
contract. Maximizing firm 1’s profit taking firm 2’s price as given gives rise to firm 1’s best 












Maximizing firm 2’s profit taking firm 1’s quantity as given gives rise to firm 2’s best 








= .  (8)
 
Solving the system of equations comprising (7) and (8) yields the equilibrium values for the 
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It is obvious to see that the solution in (9) is valid for all parameters in the space Sr. 
Consider next the (P, Q) case in which firm 1 chooses the price contract while firm 2 
chooses the quantity contract in the first stage of the game. Maximizing firm 1’s profit taking 
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Maximizing firm 2’s profit taking firm 1’s price as given gives rise to firm 2’s best response 












Solving the system of equations comprising (10) and (11) yields the equilibrium values for the 
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From (12), both firms produce a positive quantity as long as condition (4) is satisfied. Hence, 
(12) gives the solution to the (Q, P) case when condition (4) holds. If condition (4) does not 
hold then it is straightforward to verify that the limit-pricing solution given by (6) is the 
corner solution for the (Q, P) case. 
 
3.  The Two-Stage Game 
  
We now study the two-stage game in which the two firms each choose between a price 
contract and a quantity contract in the first stage and then in the second stage they compete 
according to their first-stage choice of contract. The reduced first-stage game matrix may take 
one of the following two forms. If condition (4) is satisfied then the game matrix is given by 
 










2 π )     (
P
1 π , 
Q






2 π )     (
C
1 π , 
C
2 π ) 
 
 
In this game matrix, 
B
1 π  and 
B
2 π  are given by (5), 
C
1 π  and 
C
2 π  are given by (3), 
P
1 π  and 
Q
2 π  are 
given by (12), and 
Q
1 π  and 
P
2 π   are given by (9). If condition (4) is not satisfied then the 
reduced first-stage game matrix is given by 
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In this matrix, the second column is the same as in the first matrix above and 
L
1 π  is given by 
(6).  
  The following lemma will help us find the Nash equilibrium in each of the above two 
game matrices. (The proof of this lemma involves straightforward algebra and is omitted.) 
 
Lemma 1:  
(i)  
Q
i π  > 
C
i π  > 
B
i π  > 
P
i π ,  i = 1,2;  
(ii) 
L
1 π  > 
C
1 π . 
 
  Part (ii) of Lemma 1 confirms the reversal in profit relationship between price and 
quantity competition. Namely, if condition (4) is not satisfied then the more efficient firm 1’s 
profit is higher when the firms compete in prices than when they compete in quantities. 
However, parts (i) and (ii) of Lemma 1 together imply that each firm’s profit from choosing 
the quantity contract is never less than that from choosing the price contract holding the other 
firm’s choice of price or quantity contract fixed.  
The following proposition follows immediately from the relationships in Lemma 1. 
 
Proposition 1: If condition (4) holds then the two-stage game has a dominant strategy 
equilibrium in which both firms choose the quantity contract in the first stage. If condition (4) 
does not hold then the two-stage game has a weakly dominant strategy equilibrium in which 
both firms choose the quantity contract in the first stage. 
 
  Proposition 1 implies that the two-stage game in which firms choose between a price 
contract and a quantity contract in the first stage and then compete accordingly in the second 
stage has a unique Nash equilibrium in that both firms choose the quantity contract in the first 
stage of the game. The first part of this proposition is simply an extension of similar result by 
Singh and Vives (1984) except here the parameter space is larger than that considered by 
Singh and Vives. The second part of this proposition confirms that the Singh and Vives result 
essentially holds for the entire parameter space Sr.  
We have thus shown that the possibility of (partial) reversal in profit relationships 
between price competition and quantity competition will not alter the conclusion that in the 
two-stage game they will always choose the quantity contract in equilibrium. This is 
unfortunate on welfare grounds since this outcome is welfare inferior to the outcome when 
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